Saturday, June 30, 2012

CEF Portfolio Concentration vs. Yield


The way I was trained in credit, i.e. where there is default risk, is that since investors are only getting back par plus coupons there should be a strong bias toward reducing large losses.  This goal is achieved by lending in a way that defaults are not correlated (avoiding loading up on overlapping sectors, regions etc.) as well as portfolio size diversification so that idiosyncratic risks are reduced as well. 
This doctrine is different than equity investing, where there are much larger payoffs to portfolio concentration, since investors enjoy unlimited upside, and do not have good investments forcibly paid back (like a callable bond).
In that vein, I ran some numbers to compare the yields of CEF's I follow vs. a simplistic measure of their portfolio concentration (as a proxy for that risk of a large loss).  I pulled the sum of percentages of each funds top 10 positions.  That may not truly capture the risks as some funds (particularly those that use derivatives/govt bonds extensively) will show up as artificially riskier under this measure.  But I think, in the main, it's illustrative of the portfolio construction, and risks assumed, of the various management teams. 
My bias, all things being equal between yields, is to prefer the more diversified holdings.
Closed End Funds
NameYieldConc
JFRNUVEEN FLOATING RATE INCOME7.5116.59
EFTEATON VANCE FLOAT RT INC TR6.548.74
BGTBLACKROCK FLT RT INC6.4613.43
BSLBLACKSTONE/GSO SENIOR FLOAT6.8611.46
FCTFIRST TRUST SENIOR FLOATING6.7811.06
PPRING PRIME RATE TRUST7.2416.91
VVRINVESCO VAN KAMPEN SENIOR IN6.5811.45
DVFBLACKROCK DIVERSIFIED INCM S6.8612.09
AFTAPOLLO SENIOR FLOATING RATE6.94#N/A N/A
GDVGABELLI DIVIDEND & INCOME TR6.0713.99
MGUMACQUARIE GLOBAL INFR TOT RT5.3343.74
UTFCOHEN & STEERS INFRASTRUCTUR8.2129.36
RVTROYCE VALUE TRUST5.917.89
USALIBERTY ALL STAR EQUITY FUND6.9119.34
LGILAZARD GLOBAL TOT RT & INC6.8030.98
EVTEATON VANCE TAX-ADV DVD INC7.9219.80
NIEAGIC EQUITY & CONVERTIBLE IN6.6419.33
GLOCLOUGH GLBL OPPORTUNITIES FD9.9452.65
BDJBLACKROCK ENHANCED EQUITY DI9.4321.09
EOSEATON VANCE ENH EQT INC II9.9636.09
ETJEATON VANCE RISK-MANAGED DIV10.9528.76
EXGEATON VANCE TAX-MANAGED GLOB11.6719.89
JPZNUVEEN EQUITY PREMIUM INCOME8.8822.97
JSNNUVEEN EQUITY PREM OPP FUND9.2628.63
NFJNFJ DVD INTEREST & PR STRAT10.5025.32
DBLDOUBLELINE OPPORTUNISTIC CRE7.4525.44
JMTNUVEEN MTG OPPORT TERM FUND8.4115.58
DMOWESTERN ASSET MORTGAGE DEFIN8.0610.26
JLSNUVEEN MORTGAGE OPPORTUNITY8.4518.58
FMYFIRST TRUST MORTGAGE INCOME9.7542.82
EHIWESTERN ASSET GLOBAL HIGH IN8.6711.92
FLCFLAH & CRUM/CLYMORE TOT RET8.6529.46
JPSNUVEEN QUALITY PREFERRED II7.2421.51
JHSJOHN HANCOCK INCOME SECS TR6.9219.37
HPSJOHN HANCOCK PFD INCOME III7.6327.53
ACGALLIANCEBERNSTEIN INC FUND5.7354.36
AWFALLIANCEBERNSTEIN GL HI INC7.979.52
LBFDWS GLBL HIGH INCOME FD INC6.0730.60
GDOWESTERN ASSET GL CORP DEF OP7.9211.64
BNABLACKROCK INCOME OPPTY TRST6.2459.59
BPPBLACKROCK CREDIT ALLOC III6.6424.76
BTZBLACKROCK CREDIT ALLOC IV7.0824.26
PSWBLACKROCK CREDIT ALLOCAT I7.0326.28
PSYBLACKROCK CREDIT ALLOCAT II6.7621.45
MCRMFS CHARTER INCOME TRUST6.6611.15
MMTMFS MULTIMARKET INC TRUST6.7310.94
JQCNUVEEN CREDIT STRATEGIES INC8.6916.68
MTSMONTGOMERY ST INCOME SEC INC3.7245.87
ICBMORGAN STANLEY INCOME SECS4.6115.74
BHKBLACKROCK CORE BOND TRUST6.0356.36
JPCNUVEEN PREFERRED INCOME OPPO8.2022.04
GCFGLOBAL INCOME & CURRENCY6.8461.16
ERCWELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE MULTI7.8516.70
CSQCALAMOS STRAT TOT RETURN FD8.5726.41
GDFWESTERN ASSET GLOBAL PARTNER9.3717.87
EDDMORGAN STANLEY EMERGING MARK7.5071.62
CHWCALAMOS GLOBAL DYNAMIC INCOM8.7012.39
TEITEMPLETON EMERG MKTS INC FD6.1335.58
PHKPIMCO HIGH INCOME FUND10.6645.53
PCMPIMCO COMMERCIAL MTG SECS TR8.5736.03
PDIPIMCO DYNAMIC INCOME FUND8.24#N/A N/A
PKOPIMCO INCOME OPPORTUNITY FUN8.3631.28
PFNPIMCO INCOME STRATEGY FD II9.0833.68
PFLPIMCO INCOME STRATEGY FUND9.0135.31
RCSPIMCO STRATEGIC GLBL GOVT8.2626.94
PCNPIMCO CORPORATE & INCOME STR7.9637.55
PTYPIMCO CORPORATE & INCOME OPP8.1326.10
GOFGUGGENHEIM STRATEGIC OPPORTU8.6827.37


Some things that stuck out to me:  how much idiosyncratic risk the PIMCO CEF's tend to have. (Just punch up some of their holdings list to see what I'm talking about)  I realize they have excellent credit analysts, but one can compare a typical HY offering in their lineup to something like Alliance's HY funds and see that there is much more security selection diversification in the A-B product -- albeit at a cost in yield.  What I find a little odd is that for a shop that prides itself on macro calls (PIMCO secular forum and all that...) they are using their security selection expertise in driving their strong FI CEF performance. It comes down to what you are looking for in your CEFs -- security selection conviction or portfolio diversification.  The average concentration number across the funds I'm tracking (clearly many kinds) is 26%.
==================
Just to clarify what my proxy for the idea of large loss is very simply: concentration risk = sum of top ten positions percent weight.
For example, looking at PFN:
BACR 14 11/29/49BACR5.556
AIG 8.175 05/15/58AIG4.821
PNC 12 12/29/49PNC3.768
NTHRN CA PWR-TXB-B-LONORPWR3.194
COBKAC 11 12/31/49COBKAC2.982
RABOBK 6 ⅞ 03/19/20RABOBK2.858
PPL 9 ½ 07/01/13PPL2.806
WFC 7.98 03/29/49WFC2.657
AIG 6.765 11/15/17AIG2.556
AMERN MUN PWR-B-BABSAMEPWR2.487
PFN's concentration is the sum of the final column: 33.68%
Adding more funds -- that do not have overlapping portfolios -- will reduce the concentration risk across one's holdings.  This can be an argument for diversifying across multiple management companies.  
I'm trying to figure out how to get a portfolio VaR* and then compare that to the yield, but that only covers the NAV, ...and I can't automate that into a spreadsheet.  One can look at long run comparisons of market price volatility to NAV volatility and scale them, as well.  
*VaR has lots of issues too I know.
PS: I've run some sample numbers on VaR and CVaR, which are not perfect, since CEF holdings do not get modeled in toto, but they loosely line up with the concentration numbers.  That is: funds with high concentration metrics seem to show higher VaR numbers for their portfolios.  That makes intuitive sense.

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Greenlight RE - GLRE - High Level Thoughts

Thoughts on Greenlight RE, ticker symbol GLRE.

  • GLRE is primarily an investment vehicle to access Greenlight Capital.  To get the various advantages this vehicle has, the company has to operate a bona fide reinsurer.  The reinsurance business is designed to provide that legal/tax cover, and perhaps add a smidge of returns over time.  It's primarily a "frequency" style of book, which is designed to have losses that are predictable, rather than a "severity" style of book which accrues gains for a long time, and then takes a big bath periodically.
  • There is not much capital markets sponsorship, as far as I can tell just CS and UBS cover name.  UBS had an 8 page report on 4/30. Looking at CS reports uninformative.  Is coverage a courtesy given DME commission payments?  Perhaps they have to be circumspect in what they are saying, if they do not want to get in trouble with the SEC for having a registered vehicle be a front door into unregulated hedge funds.
  • Reviewed the Q's & K's as well as the management presentation from May 21.  Looks satisfactory, but to be fair, I have not read enough insurance filings to really know if something would be wildly out of sorts.  Looks like frequency business seems to be running at 102 combined ratio.  Not much severity biz to be written.  66mm is supposedly this biggest single hit they could take, with 102mm total.  When thinking about the company, it seems to me that this is a sort of "short put" that needs to be considered. 
  • The raison d'etre of the firm is the 1.1 Bn investment book.  In addition to all the usual Einhorn long/short equity positions there 500-700mm in sov/corp CDS exposure, as well as short outright cash bonds.  Also some GLD and interest rate swaps, supposedly on the Japanese Yen. Roughly flat last year (2%) and about the same ytd.
  • These were surpisingly solid writeups here and here
  • My calculation of book value (as of 6/6) is 22.62, suggesting a current P/B of about 1.10 to 1.11.  What is a reasonable price to pay for:
    • access to Einhorn's mgmt skills (his LP's have been closed since 2008)
    • insurance co. float (i.e. non recourse leverage) which runs about 32% currently
    • tax sheltered compounding as well as daily liquidity
  • The CDS book (from the filings) seems to be having a significant carry cost.  My estimate is 10mm a quarter, which suggests they are paying 350bps in carry costs.  Those numbers could be off.   It also looks like they are positioned for rising rates and USD, as the investment book makes a little money in both those cases, at least according to the stress test presented.
  • As others have alluded to, this is hard to replicate by oneself. 
============
Updated as of June Month End - Fresh estimated book value - my calc's put it at very close to the same as last mo.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

My reading list

Occasionally people in our industry ask me what I read, and it's always a useful topic to get a sense on how others think about the craft of investment and risk management.  I read extensively, generally in a disciplined fashion, and find that the habit improves my decision making.

I've set up seven different categories of research I follow, in separate bookmarks.  I also use a news-feed aggregator, to keep track of all the excellent blogs that also are publishing serious material.  It's harder to keep up with blogs so sometimes those get reviewed on the weekends.

What I follow, with items in bold of most import.

Mass Media & Market Data - via their sites as well as my terminal
  • Bloomberg Professional
  • New York Times
  • Wall Street Journal
  • Barron's
Independent Research & Newsletters
  • Bank Credit Analyst
  • High Tech Strategist
  • Grant's Interest Rate Observer
  • Global Macro Investor
  • Green Street Advisors
  • Morningstar
  • LitmanGregory
  • Ed Yardeni
  • TrendMacrolytics
  • AnalytixInsight (irregularly)
  • Roubini Global Economics (irregularly)
Trade Journals & Professional Societies
  • Pensions & Investments
  • Institutional Investor / Investor Intelligence Network
  • Hedge Fund Alert
  • CFA Institute
  • CAIA AllaboutAlpha
  • GARP
Buyside Research, Investor Letters, and White Papers
  • Bridgewater Daily Observations (if you can get this, it's superb)
  • PIMCO Insights
  • GMO
  • Wellington Knowledge Bank
  • Van Hoisington
  • Third Avenue
  • Warren Buffet
  • Eclectica/Hugh Hendry
  • NeubergerBerman
  • Research Affiliates
  • BlackRock Insights
  • Partners Group
  • Hussman
Sellside Research
  • Goldman Sachs (esp David Kostin, Buzz Gregory, Jan Hatzius)
  • Barclays (Barry Knapp, credit, and index research)
  • Deutsche Bank (quant work, program trading)
  • Societe Generale (cross asset)
  • Credit Suisse (quant research, derivs)
  • Nomura (macro, quant)
  • JP Morgan (quant, macro, economic, as well as their buyside notes, especially Michael Cembalist)
Academic Research (I should probably allocate more time to the practitioner journals)
  • Q Group
  • Columbia GSB
  • SSRN
  • Journal of Investment Management (irregularly)
  • MSCI / Barra
  • FRB Banks as well as some NGOs (IMF, EBRD, BIS etc.)
Ratings Agencies (I've been impressed by CreditSights in the past, but don't use them currently)
  • Moody's
  • S&P
Consultants (Even though I have access to a half dozen investment consultants work, it's rare in this category for anything to be notable but these are ones I've liked)
  • BCG
  • McKinsey
  • Russell Investments
  • Tower Watson
Blogs (some publish frequently, some less so... and this list is roughly in order of importance/priority)
  • ZeroHedge
  • Dealbreaker
  • Aleph
  • Calculated Risk
  • Abnormal Returns
  • Mish's Global Economic Trend Monitor
  • Bronte Capital
  • Falkenblog
  • Distressed Debt Investor
  • Dealbook Deal Professor
  • WorldBeta
  • Michael Pettis China Financial Markets
  • Dr Housing Bubble
  • Greg Mankiw
  • Infectious Greed
  • Jimmy Rogers
  • Felix Salmon
  • Rick Bookstaber
  • MPI Blog
There's a lot of information out there, and filtering the signal from the noise is more important that actually getting more data.  It's easier to read confirmatory viewpoints/analysis, but usually does not provide as much value as seeing the opposing view.

Monday, April 30, 2012

Spain Downgrades

·         On Friday, April 26 Standard & Poor’s ratings agency cut their long term sovereign credit rating for Kingdom of Spain from A to BBB+.  S&P analysts downgraded the nation because the economic contraction in Spain has been worse than previously projected.  To visualize how severe the conditions are in Spain, observe the unemployment rate since 2005


·         At the same time that tax revenues are dropping, the income support governments typically offer (unemployment insurance etc.) are increasing.  In addition, Spanish regional governments are also undergoing financial strain, and are seeking help from the national central government.  The central government’s reform agenda (e.g. higher medical copay’s, larger classroom sizes, centralized purchasing etc.) proposed will help, but will take time, and seem to only nibble at Spain’s deep problems with inflexible labor laws.   And, similar to the US during 2008, numerous Spanish financial institutions are receiving governmental financial support.  These have prevented a “bank run” by depositors, but the costs are still unfolding, as savings banks/cajas have been slow to recognize loan losses on their property portfolios.  The combination of these burdens have developed into a perfect storm of increased sovereign obligations right when tax collections are down sharply.  Here is how Spain compares to her regional peers


·         The knock on effects of sovereign downgrades flow through to intertwined corporates, typically financials and state owned enterprises.  So, one of the first effects of the Spanish downgrade is on her banking system, which was broadly downgraded on Monday, April 30, when 16 financials were cut.  Most of these are not trading counterparties for CalPERS, but of the global trading banks, Banco Santander was dropped to A- and BBVA to BBB+.  Generally, it is rare for corporates to enjoy ratings that are superior to their domicile, which Santander does. 
·         Note that since the ECB started their LTRO program, Spanish banks have boosted their holdings of Spanish sovereign debt by 38%.  In general, “risky” debt issuers such as Spain (and Italy) are seeing their local bond auctions dominated by domestic purchasers.  The renationalization of finance defeats many of the original synergies the common currency was supposed to provide. ECB haircuts depend on “best of four” ratings and will not change unless the other three rating agencies also downgrade Spain to below A-.  
·         Market signals, such as bond prices and credit default spreads, have been pointing toward a ratings cut.  Here are implied ratings as of mid-April:


·         Greek elections are on May 6, and if voters reject continuing with IMF/EU reform mandates that could set trigger another peripheral sovereign “risk off” cycle.  The French 2nd round is also that day, and if the Socialist candidate Hollande delivers on his campaign statements (higher taxes, more govt spending, ECB focus on growth rather than inflation, etc.), the bond market could also have more volatility.
·         The formal ratings are at risk of dropping further if debt/GDP ratios worsen, political support for reform agendas waver, or more obligations are moved from the private sector to the public burden.  The investment implication is to be cautious in accepting uncompensated risks (such as counterparty exposure) to Spanish banks such as Banco Santander or BBVA.

Source material: Moodys, S&P, Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, BarCap, JPMorgan.

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

Hugh Hendry (Eclectica Asset Mgmt) Discussion

Hugh Hendry (Eclectica Asset Mgmt) Discussion

·         Why doesn’t high IQ lead to high investment returns?  Managers who are smart do not seem to understand how irrational governments, markets, and other players are/can be.
·         US Capital Allocation: long term basis of positive returns, a legacy of rational behavior.  The fruits of this are a high consumption ratio / GDP.  This is good – enjoying (earned) prosperity
·         Chinese Capital Allocation: not rational, not done on the basis of economic returns, but conducted on social norms and fitting in to govt plans / crony capitalism.  So there will be no relation to returns.  This is an Asian phenomenon also observed in Japanese kereitsu and Korean chaebol.
·         QE I has led to Asian inflation (food, wages, RE).  Believes CPI is meaningless
·         Democracy cannot tolerate Austerity.  Example given of Royal Navy “mutiny” in 1931 at prospect of pay cuts.
·         Gold: ten years ago this was a contentious trade, challenged by investors/clients.  Today it is not, and is almost a consensus trade.
·         Hendry claims it is hard to engineer inflation even if nations try.  Rejects example of Zimbabwe, as it’s not the same kind of society as DM nations.  Says there are so many checks and balances to inflation that leaping those hurdles is only possible if there is a deep depression.  Uses example of Japan.
·         Believes there will be a China hard landing.  25% decline in GDP (!)
·         Analogue is US in Great Depression: DM market of UK had 8% drop in GDP peak to trough, EM market of USA had 26% drop. Much more excess to be wrung out of system in China/EM.
·         Believes world’s strongest economies (currently) will be the ones that will fall the hardest
·         Central Paradox: if one believes that inflation is inevitable, the safest asset are UST for today.  Real assets will get destroyed in the scenarios he envisions.
·         Japan: their utility co’s have issued more debt than Greece.  Govt does not know what to do about guaranteeing those.  Japanese CDS on cyclical names (steels, concrete etc.) are ripe to pop once slowdown starts moving.  Points out how large the Japanese economy is (i.e. world capital goods are still sourced from there in many sectors) so cannot hide from pan Asian slowdown.
·         Does not believe the 1% ECB level for short term funding is a Maginot line that will stand.  Thinks that they will cut rates, and suggests high convexity trade is to position for that.
·         When asked “what assets do you like from the long side?” – long pause, then “there is nothing good in the world”

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

Rebalancing Opportunities

This is an overview of what happened to equities & credit in prior recessions, along with a comparison with where we are currently.

There may be more ‘rebalancing opportunities’ ahead.

Wednesday, December 29, 2010

EMU Breakup Framework

Background

European sovereigns are experiencing financial stress from fiscal deficits and rolling their existing debt.  These issues are worsened as members of the European Monetary Union. The EMU is a common currency shared by 16 of the 27 European Union members, with one more nation to join in 2011.  By being a member of a currency union, an individual nation’s ability to target an exchange rate and interest rate policy appropriate for its point in the business and employment cycle is effectively surrendered.  The nations in Europe having the most problems with their debt are those with low labor productivity, high current account deficits, large financial system debt relative to GDP, or low tax compliance: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy.  The other EMU nations and the IMF have combined to create a European Financial Stabilization Fund in order to prevent systemic financial risk.  The EFSF will purchase the debt of the troubled nations for the next 3 years -- unless the private markets come back sooner; both Greece and Ireland have tapped the EFSF for funds so far. 

Scenarios

It is difficult to judge what the various probabilities of outcomes are.  Roubini Global Economics has forecast a 35% chance of some kind of breakdown by the end of 2012, with this risk increasing to 45% by 2020.  Rather than handicapping the odds, the most important takeaway is that it’s not a zero delta any more.  Here are some potential scenarios:

A: Greek Exit

The Greek situation is difficult as their deficit is driven by a large primary budget gap, in addition to a financing gap.  This is analogous to a corporation with a negative operating cash flow, and a poor financial structure.  Financial restructuring can fix a “bad” capital stack, but it cannot make a good business.  Greece is stuck in a similar situation – even if it imposes 50% haircuts on its bondholders – it can not solve its structural deficit problem.  The surplus nations / creditors solution to keep extending loans (via EFSF) delays the readjustment in order to buy time for the creditor countries banking system.  The policy prescriptions of austerity, wage deflation, tax hikes, and spending cuts inexorably drive Debt/GDP ratios higher rather than lower, as the economy undergoes a recession.  At some point, the austerity being imposed by outsiders will grow intolerable, as deflation forces most of the adjustment costs onto the domestic economy (and voters) rather than broadly sharing the burden between borrowers and lenders.  At that point, it is reasonable to expect these events: euro withdrawal, currency devaluation, and debt restructuring.  During this upheaval, it is typical for a financial emergency be declared and capital controls imposed.  Given that 90% of Greek debt is governed under local law (unlike Argentina who issued under American & English law) the Greek government has more ability to control the adjustment process, and reduce the damage afterwards from reduced access to markets.  Some market price forecasts

            Bond Haircuts: S&P has suggested recovery rates for bondholders at 30% to 50%
            Currency Adjustment: ING has suggested a “New Drachma” would fall 80% vs. the EUR
            Bond Yields: RGE suggests Bunds go to sub 1% yields while peripheral yields hit 7-12%
            Euro: estimates vary widely but ranges from .85 to 1.15 vs. USD are suggested
           
B: Partial Breakup

The way the EFSF is structured -- as a supranational borrowing fund partially backed by the very same borrowers -- creates a vicious circle as more countries avail themselves of the facility.  Essentially, as the funding lines get drawn on by more member nations, the burden increases on the dwindling number of backers.  Under this domino theory, after the first EMU withdrawal, the contagion will spread quickly to the other peripheral nations, eventually leading to the PIGS nations withdrawing from the EMU, in order to make economic adjustments without the limitations of a monolithic currency and interest rate.  Under this scenario the EMU splits into a hard currency bloc and mostly Mediterranean currencies.  In addition to some of the forecast impacts above, there will be further damage as the European financial sector sees its capital base destroyed.  Government bonds play an important role in depository banking, being both an interest earning asset, as well as the regulatory capital set aside to protect against credit losses.  So when regulatory capital goes bad, it has a particularly crushing effect on the financial sector.  The exposure to PIGS debt ranges from 20% - 40% among the large Western European banks, and the sector still is weak from the 2008-9 financial crisis and recession.

C: Full Dismantling

Under the extreme stress test, northern European nations are unable to agree on a hard currency bloc and, like their neighbors to the south, decide their national interest is best pursued with sole control of their store of value / medium of exchange, and its interest rate.  In this case one could expect wide divergence between end currency values and interest rates.  If one looks at the original rates that each nation entered into the union at, nearly all will suffer devaluation upon exit if an account surplus/deficit model is used.  The valuation adjustment would be borne by Germany who would exit with a currency that was stronger than it entered EMU with -- the product of a decade of surpluses, high productivity, and competitive exports.  However that still may not mean the resurrected DEM is worth more vs. USD compared to its entry value – given how much the EUR will fall as the EMU disintegrates!  Given the massive uncertainty over how currencies might be translated over, one would expect a flight to safety to USD, CHF and possibly NOK / SEK.

First Order Effects

The first order effects will be price shocks to a host of financial instruments both within the EU / EMU and, as the waves ripple outwards, toward other areas.  Based on the scenarios described above, ascribe more severity as the EMU proceeds to fragmentation; less if it’s a single national withdrawal.  Here are some range estimates from research we have reviewed. 

            FX:      
                        Greece – A new drachma could be 80% lower vs. EUR
                        Spain / Portugal / Ireland – Pesetas, Escudos, and Punts could be 50% devalued vs. new DEM
                        Italy – Lira down 25% vs. new DEM
                        France – Franc down 15% vs. new DEM
                        Other core – Benelux, Austria, Finland down 7.5% vs. new DEM
                        Euro – as the crisis deepens, rates from .75-1.15 suggested
                        USD / CHF – Flight to safety currencies, others may be Nordics.

            Recovery Rates:
                        Estimates are recovery rates of 30% to 50% on an NPV basis.
                        Haircuts for bond holders could take the form of
Rescheduled maturity
Principal adjustment
Coupon manipulation.                

            Bond Yields:
                        Wide divergence expected
                                    Northern Core – low rates, with some reaching sub 1% yield
                                    Peripherals – high rates, with worst hitting teen range

            Curve Shape:
                        Money market rates to compress as assets flood into ‘cash’
                        Curve to steepen as risk premium for term money heightens

Second Order Effects

After the immediate price shocks, there will be numerous additional impacts across the economy and markets.  One of the first will be capital controls as governments seek to redenominate assets and liabilities in their country, and stop mobile capital from leaving.  These will be difficult to implement, as having moved to one common currency simply makes it easier for those in troubled nations to move their financial holdings abroad.  Greece and Ireland are already experiencing domestic depositor flight from their banks, so capital controls may come even before EMU unwind.  A second large effect from EMU fragmentation will be the capital destruction in the major European banks.  Despite the small size of most of the peripheral countries, they have issued large amounts of debt, and most of that resides on the balance sheets of the banking system.  (Why? With ECB interest rates at effectively 0% and no longer any limits on collateral quality, European banks are running the carry trade…in size)  Banking systemic distress will be the second powerful knock on effect. As the banking system becomes insolvent (not just illiquid) regulators and legislators will have to make painful choices: does the pain get imposed on the bondholders / equity holders only, or does this risk get socialized?  The track record over the last two years points toward repeating the privatization of gains and the socialization of losses.  As business and consumer confidence are dented from the above, it’s reasonable to think the real economy will suffer as US commerce slowed sharply after the financial crisis crescendo of fall 2008.


Longer Term

Over the longer term, a partial (or full) splintering of the EMU will reduce growth within the EZ.  A common currency made EMU economies more efficient by reducing friction costs and improving planning – that advantage will be reduced if EMU is ended.  That reduction in regional economic growth has been estimated at 1% to 9%, depending on the scale of unwind.  Peripheral countries pulling out will be impacted more.  As debt is destroyed, there are deflationary effects as well, which could spill over to other regions.  In particular, a strengthening USD may hurt US exporters, and tip the US economy back into recession.  Global growth and inflation ought to be lower after EMU unwind.

Case Studies

Here are recent sovereign bailouts/defaults, along with commentary from Bridgewater Associates. 

Bretton Woods Exit: USD devalued against gold, prices moved from $35/oz to $70/oz from 1968 to 1972, essentially a 50% devaluation
Mexico 94: 60% currency devaluation
Thailand 97: 40% devaluation
Indonesia 97: 60% devaluation initially, 90% eventually banking system and external debt restructured.  Hyperinflation
Korea 97: 50% devaluation, but rapid recovery in fx, markets, and growth
Russia 98: 80% devaluation, default
Brazil 98: 40% devaluation
Argentina 01: 65% devaluation, capital controls, default
Hungary 08: 30% devaluation, 10% further later, debt continues to spiral up
Pakistan 08: 25% devaluation, stabilizing
Ukraine 08: 35% devaluation, stabilizing, but not out of woods yet
Iceland 08: ~ 50% devaluation, capital controls, banks insolvent, depositary insurance revoked

One key thing to note, in almost all situations sovereign debt problems are generally not solved with austerity.  Canada and Nordic countries in the 90’s are noticeable outliers in that case, benefiting from global growth and unusual domestic political solidarity in bringing the fiscal house into order.  The majority of times, imbalances are resolved in a way that imposes burdens on creditors: whether its devaluation, restructuring or default.  The EMU takes away some of these options, suggesting that staying within the structure is economically and politically unstable.

The trend within Europe, over 50 years plus, from the first formation of a coal and steel customs union across the Alsace-Lorraine, has been toward deeper integration and harmonization of countries.  This is a powerful trend to buck, and there are good arguments that the current crisis will lead to a “Federal Europe” rather than a schism.  It seems difficult to reconcile that when languages, customs, and ethnicities are so different, even across small regions.  India is a case where a federal system does work (despite the language and customs differences) but note that the state governments there are powerful relative to the central national government.  But I do want to acknowledge that potential policy solution to the problem; RGE assesses a 25% chance of that outcome.

Investment Implications

The impact among European financial equities would be severe, as most financial companies are inherently leveraged, and even small haircuts to asset values can quickly wipe out equity.  Revisiting the market capitalization changes of US financial equities during the 07-09 financial crisis would be instructive to show how quickly even the largest institutions could fall.  Even ‘national champion’ TBTF banks could fall, if the sovereign that implicitly backs them is not large enough to meet claims, or is unwilling to.  In this respect, the impact is not purely analyzable from a spreadsheet / economics perspective, but requires careful thought around the domestic and international politics of the affected nations.  (For example, Latvia which is weathering a crushing austerity program to meet its obligations, and doing so with a resigned societal solidarity.  Why?  To citizenry there, there is the perspective that EMU/EZ/NATO is a package deal, and that failure in one part will lead to a collapse in the other parts.  Having only recently left the Russian sphere of influence, NATO membership is needed as a bulwark against Russian influence, and a shield citizenry are willing to pay a heavy price for)

Milestones to Watch

The value of the Euro, the inter Sovereign CDS spread markets, and the equities / credits of European financials will all be important measures of the real time probabilities of EMU disintegration (in one form or another).

Conclusion

We should consider putting on a portfolio tilt to actively underweight financials.  This is painful, as this sector is already considered cheap by many metrics.  Again, that is a topic for deeper exploration but if history is a guide, financial equities tend to be poor performers when underlying sovereigns credit is deteriorating.